Nordic Finance & the Good Society Seminar with David Zaring

Associate Professor, David Zaring David Zaring is an Associate Professor at Wharton, University of Pennsylvania.

Seminar Info Professor: David Zaring Title: “The Foreign Relation Power of the Federal Reserve” Organized by: Center for Corporate Governance, Nordic Finance & the Good Society Date: October 10, 2016 Time: 16.30 – 18.00 h

His scholarship addresses financial and regulatory law from an international perspective. He graduated from Harvard Law School, J.D. with the distinction magna cum laude.

This paper explores how the Federal Reserve interacts with, disrupts, and contributes to the struggle for foreign relations power between the U.S. President and Congress.  In doing so, the Fed shapes the positions on questions of international economic law and relations taken by the country in ways poorly understood by both lawyers and academics.  The Fed’s approach – cosmopolitan when it comes to financial regulation and economic crises, but unilateralist when it comes to monetary policy – varies between contributing to the overall stock of international engagement made by the United States, and withdrawing from it.  

The Fed has practiced its own brand of foreign relations since – and even before – its founding.  Throughout its existence, it has kept up relations with its foreign counterparts.  Often, these relationships have been cosmopolitan, while the branches of government have been less interested in foreign collaborations.  Sometimes, however, the Fed is an America Firster, threatening damage to some of the United States’ sensitive alliances.  In either case, the Fed has been an unexamined participant in setting the terms of international economic law and governance in a way that addresses systemic risk.

In neither of these cases, however, is the Fed supervised by Congress or the President.  Instead, the Fed has proven to be the most independent of independent agencies, even, it appears, in areas traditionally imagined to fall squarely within the realm of presidential power. 

After essaying the Fed’s role in setting the terms of international economic law, this paper explores an approach to integrating its foreign policy into the foreign affairs law of the United States that preserves the Fed’s independence while also addressing the issue of intra-government coordination.

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Financial Regulation Seminar with Professor John Kay

Professor: John Kay Title: “Other People’s Money” Organized by: Center for Corporate Governance Date: September 29, 2016 Time: 16.30-18.00 h Venue: Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 20, Ovnhallen, 2000 Frederiksberg

Professor John Kay

John Kay is one of Britain’s leading economists. He is a visiting Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and has been a fellow of St. John’s College, Oxford, since 1970. He is a distinguished academic, a successful businessman, an adviser to companies and governments around the world, and an acclaimed columnist. His work has been mostly concerned with the application of economics to the analysis of changes in industrial structure and the competitive advantage of individual firms. His interests encompass both business strategy and public policy. John Kay is a Fellow of the British Academy and the Royal Society of Edinburgh.


Over the last half century, the evolution of the finance sector has led to the substitution of transactions for relationships. The outcome has been a sector which largely talks to itself, trades with itself, and has increasingly lost touch with the needs of the real economy for financial services.  In this talk, John Kay will describe how financialisation came about, identify how finance can improve the efficiency of business and the lives of households, and propose a programme of reform. Regulation, he will argue, has been as much the problem as the solution:  what is needed is a new philosophy focussed on industry structure and personal and corporate incentives rather than the elaboration of prescriptive rule books.

Financial Regulation Seminar w. Dirk Schoenmaker (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Professor Dirk Schoenmaker will give his talk titled: “Should the “Outs” join Banking Union?”.

Date and time: April 12, 2016 at 4:30 pm

Place: Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 22, 2000 Frederiksberg, “Raavarebygningen”, Room: PHR417

Dirk Schoenmaker is is Professor of Banking and Finance at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam and a Senior Fellow at Bruegel. He is also a member of the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board at the ECB and a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR). His research and teaching focus on the areas of central banking and financial stability, financial system architecture, European financial integration, and circular economy. He is regular speaker at academic and professional conferences.

Abstract:The Single Market stimulates cross-border banking throughout the European Union. This paper documents the banking linkages between the 9 ‘outs’ and 19 ‘ins’ of the Banking Union. We find that some of the major banks, based in Sweden and Denmark, have substantial banking claims across the Nordic and Baltic region. We also find large banking claims from banks based in the Banking Union to the new member states. These findings indicate that these ‘out’ countries could profit from joining Banking Union, because it would provide a stable arrangement for managing financial stability. From a political perspective, member states’ opinion on joining the Banking Union ranges from an outright no towards considering Banking Union membership.

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Financial Regulation Seminar w. David Vines (Oxford)

Professor David Vines will give his talk titled: “Restoring Trust in the Financial System”.

Date and time: March 16, 2016 at 4:30 pm

Place: Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 22, 2000 Frederiksberg, “Raavarebygningen”, Room: PHR417

David Vines is Professor of Economics, and Fellow of Balliol College, at Oxford University, where, in addition, he is Acting Director of the Political Economy of Financial Markets Programme at St Anthony’s College and Director of the Ethics and Economics Programme at the Institute for New Economic Thinking in the Oxford Martin School. He is also a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London. David’s current research is on the restoration of trust in the financial system, on the future of the European Monetary Union, and on the role of the International Monetary Fund in ensuring international macroeconomic cooperation. He teaches macroeconomics, international economics and development economics to both graduate and undergraduate students at Oxford University. David obtained a BA in Economics and Mathematics from Melbourne University in 1971, and then an MA and PhD in Economics from Cambridge University

Abstract: In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, many leading financial institutions are seeking to change their culture, in order to repair their relationship with customers, with stakeholders, and with the wider community. In this talk Professor Vines will describe the changes which appear to be necessary for such a change in culture to actually happen. The necessary reforms include:  a much clearer specification of the obligations of those who work within the industry; an identification of their corresponding responsibilities; the creation of mechanisms by which these responsibilities can be carried out; and the holding to account of those involved, in an appropriate manner. Professor Vines will describe the necessary changes at the individual level, at the corporate level, and at the broader levels of society at large, including in legal and regulatory systems. The talk will present, and expand upon, ideas which were originally presented in Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in the Financial System, edited by Nick Morris and David Vines, and published by Oxford University Press in 2014.  

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Financial Regulation Seminar w. Martin Hellwig (Bonn)

At the third seminar in the Financial Regulation Series, Martin Hellwig will visit Center for Corporate Governance.

Time: December 1, 2015 at 4 pm
Place: Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 22, 2000 Frederiksberg, Room 4.17

Martin Hellwig is director of Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and a renowned researcher focusing on research in general economic theory. On December 1st he will visit Center for Corporate Governance to talk about financial regulation.

Martin Hellwig will be talking about “Banks, Governments, and Central Banks in the Crisis”

The lecture will discuss the interplay between government debt, banking problems and monetary policy in the so-called euro crisis. Following a brief description of past events, the lecture will discuss the various feedback loops between banks and sovereigns, the role of governance over banking supervision and the project of a European banking union. The lecture will also discuss the role of monetary policy in this time of crisis, including some comments on the judicial dispute.

His talk is based on his two following papers:

  1. Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking
  2. Yes Virginia, There is a European Banking Union! But It May Not Make Your Wishes Come True

Financial Regulation Seminar w. Kathryn Judge (Columbia University)

Kathryn Judge will visit Center for Corporate Governance as the second seminar guest in our Financial Regulation Series to talk about “Information Gaps and Shadow Banking”.

Time: November 18, 2015 at 4:30 pm
Place: Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 22, 2000 Frederiksberg, Room 4.17

Please register your attendance by sending an e-mail to

Kathryn Judge is an Associate Professor of Law and the Milton Handler Fellow at Columbia Law School, New York. Her research examines financial institutions, financial innovation, systemic risk, the Federal Reserve, and the role of intermediaries in the financial markets. She has published numerous articles in journals including the University of Chicago Law Review and Stanford Law Review.

Abstract: A financial system is fragile when small shocks can trigger large effects. The 2007-2009 financial crisis revealed the shadow banking system to be exceptionally fragile and capable of bringing down the rest of the financial system, yet the reasons for this fragility remain incompletely understood. This paper provides new insights into the mechanisms through which small shocks can trigger significant market dysfunction in the shadow banking system and the challenges impeding efforts to design a regulatory regime capable of supporting shadow banking.

This paper argues that information gaps—pockets of pertinent and knowable information that is not actually known to any party, private or public—contribute to fragility and help to explain the systemic risk posed by shadow banking.It makes two claims. First, there are structural reasons to expect sizeable information gaps in the shadow banking system. Second, those information gaps make panics more likely and exacerbate the magnitude of market dysfunction likely to arise from a panic.

In undertaking the structural analysis required to identify information gaps, the paper also sheds light on why attempts to reform the shadow banking system have been so contentious and unproductive thus far. The shadow banking system is a true hybrid. It earns its “shadow” status because it operates in the capital markets, and therefore outside the prudential regulatory regime that governs banks. Yet it also merits its status as a “banking system” because it performs many of the economic functions historically fulfilled by the banking system and poses similar threats to systemic stability. In situating the shadow banking system at the nexus of these two historically distinct regimes, the analysis helps explain why policymakers and other experts often come to the table with different, and sometimes contradictory, assumptions about how markets work and how regulation can most effectively promote market functioning. By laying this foundation, clarifying how shadow banking contributes to fragility, and identifying ways to reduce that fragility, the paper also forges the beginnings of a more productive path forward.

The paper and the presentation slides are available here:

Financial Regulation Seminar w. Daniel Awrey (Oxford)

At the very first seminar in our Financial Regulation Series, Daniel Awrey will visit Center for Corporate Governance to talk about “The Mechanisms of Derivatives Market Efficiency”.

Time: October 20, 2015 at 4 pm
Place: Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 22, 2000 Frederiksberg, Room 4.17 

Please register your attendance before October 16 by sending an e-mail to

Dan Awrey is an Associate Professor of Law and Finance at the University of Oxford and Academic Director of the MSc in Law and Finance programme.  Dan’s teaching and research interests reside in the area of financial regulation and, more specifically, the regulation of banks, investment funds, derivatives markets, and financial market infrastructure.

Abstract: Gilson and Kraakman (1984) provide a causal framework for understanding how information becomes incorporated into security prices.  This framework has gone on to play an influential role in public policy debates surrounding securities fraud litigation, mandatory disclosure requirements, and insider trading restrictions.  It has also provided a basis for understanding the economic role of securities underwriters and other reputational intermediaries.  Yet despite its enduring influence, there have been few serious attempts to extend Gilson and Kraakman’s framework beyond the relatively narrow confines in which it was originally developed: the highly regulated, order-driven, and relatively liquid markets for publicly-traded stocks.

This article examines the mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency.  These mechanisms respond to information and other problems not generally encountered within public equity markets.  These problems reflect important differences in the nature of derivatives contracts, the structure of the markets in which they trade, and the sources of market liquidity.  Predictably, these problems have lead to the emergence of very different mechanisms of market efficiency.  This article describes these problems and evaluates the relative effectiveness of the mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency.  It then explores the implications of this evaluation in terms of the current policy debates around mandatory derivatives trade reporting, the push toward central clearing of standardized derivatives, dealer capital and liquidity regulation, and the optimal balance between public and private ordering within derivatives markets.

The paper is available here: